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Commentary
How Much Do Schools 
and Districts Matter?  
A Production  
Function Approach to  
School Accountability1
James L. Phelps and Michael F. Addonizio
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush convened a first-ever educa-
tion summit in Charlottesville, Virginia, with the governors of the 
states and territories. At this unprecedented summit, political leaders 
at the federal and state levels agreed to establish national education 
goals for America’s elementary and secondary schools. This national 
focus on education goals culminated in the 1994 passage by the 
U.S. Congress of legislation declaring that “all students can learn 
and achieve to high standards and must realize their potential if the 
United States is to prosper.”2   
The 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965 established Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) as the 
accountability measure for Title I schools and districts. Each state 
was required to develop its own formula based on state assessments 
in at least reading and mathematics. States varied considerably in 
their approaches to AYP, with the result that Title I schools and 
districts were held to different standards across the states. The 2001 
reauthorization of Title I, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, 
sought to bring more uniformity to the states’ AYP requirements. 
This legislation also substantially changed how AYP results are used, 
focusing on low-performing Title I schools and offering educational 
alternatives to their students.  
Under NCLB, schools and districts that fail to make AYP for two 
consecutive years are required to undergo a set of reforms and sanc-
tions designed to improve student achievement. The scope of these 
reforms and sanctions widens as a school continues to fall short of 
AYP requirements to include the offer of transfer to children who 
wish to leave the school, the provision of supplementary educa-
tional services outside of the normal school day, the replacement of 
school staff, and the conversion of the school to charter status. New 
requirements and sanctions are also imposed on school districts that 
fail to make AYP, including the withholding of funds by the state, 
replacement of district staff, and the abolition or reorganization of 
the district.  
In response to these federal mandates, the states have adopted 
or refined outcome goals for schools and students and placed new 
emphasis on school accountability for student achievement. States 
are now devoting considerable attention to the task of distinguishing 
between effective and ineffective schools. Much less attention, how-
ever, has been given to the task of identifying effective school dis-
tricts despite the considerable emphasis placed on district as well as 
school performance by NCLB. This joint focus on school and district 
performance raises the question: How do district policies, leadership, 
and support services influence the quality of teaching and learning 
in public schools? This article uses a rich longitudinal school-level 
database to estimate a model of student achievement and analyzes 
the residuals in the model to obtain estimates of the contributions 
of unobserved school and school district characteristics to student 
performance. The second section of the paper reviews recent research 
on current approaches to determining school quality on the basis of 
student achievement test scores. Section three presents an alterna-
tive approach to assessing school and district effectiveness using an 
educational production function. A production function model is 
specified in the fourth section, and empirical results are presented in 
section five. A summary of findings in presented in the final section, 
along with implications for state and federal policy and programs 
regarding school accountability.    
The School Accountability Movement in the United States
By 2000, 48 states had implemented standardized testing, includ-
ing tests in mathematics and English/language arts or reading, as an 
integral part of statewide school accountability programs.3 The other 
two states– Iowa and Nebraska– require their districts to test stu-
dents in specified grades or grade spans. Other elements of this edu-
cational reform movement include standards for student and school 
performance, teacher competency testing, and school accreditation 
programs which often include recognition and rewards for high per-
formance and assistance and, in many states, sanctions for poor 
performance. These elements of performance-based school reform 
were emphasized in the 1994 reauthorization of the federal Title I 
program as well as many state reform initiatives.4 Thirty-three states 
have set performance goals for schools or districts and use the results 
of state assessments to hold these units accountable for meeting 
these outcome goals.  
These performance-based reforms respond to school critics who 
have cited the lack of sufficient incentives for schools to improve the 
quality of teaching and learning;5 that is, these reforms seek to pro-
vide such incentives by developing measures of student achievement 
and school quality and tying financial and other rewards to those 
measures. Such rewards may take the form of school-level financial 
bonuses or statewide public recognition for excellence. Of course, 
such recognition may also translate directly into school district finan-
cial rewards in the context of inter-district school choice programs, 
where high performing schools attract residents of neighboring 
districts.
The creation of effective incentives, however, depends crucially 
on the valid and reliable measurement of school performance. In-
creasingly, policymakers agree that school performance should be 
measured in terms of the academic performance of the students in 
the school. The most prevalent measure of school performance is 
average test score levels among students in a particular grade. Test 
score levels are often reported in terms of the percentage of students 
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at a school scoring in particular ranges, such as the proportion fail-
ing, proficient or advanced. It is also understood, however, that any 
measure of school performance that is based on student performance 
should account for differences in student characteristics (particularly 
socioeconomic) and school resources. School level scores fail to do 
this.  
A number of states base school building accountability systems 
on comparisons of student achievement test scores from one year 
to the next; that is, states compare the achievement of students at 
selected grades in a given year with the achievement of students from 
the previous year at the same grade in the same school. Such change 
scores are clearly superior to single-year level scores as an indicator 
of school quality because they provide a control for the different 
endowments and starting points of the students. However, as Linn 
and Haug observed, such comparisons of student performance at a 
grade level across years assume that student characteristics that affect 
achievement levels are relatively stable from year to year for students 
attending a given school. This assumption, while reasonable for most 
schools, is invalid for schools in neighborhoods undergoing rapid 
demographic and economic change.
Other important determinants of student performance may change 
as well, confounding the interpretation of change scores as indicators 
of school quality. Kane and Staiger have shown that a substantial 
portion of the variability in schools’ change scores is due to non-
persistent factors such as an extended leave of a teacher, a teacher 
strike, or changes in rules regarding test taking, that affect test scores 
in one year but not the next. Examining fourth-grade math scores 
from North Carolina, Kane and Staiger estimated that only about 
one fourth of the variance in school change scores was attributable 
to persistent factors associated with the school.6  Linn and Haug, 
using data from Colorado’s fourth grade reading assessments, com-
puted two change scores (change in percent of students proficient or 
advanced) for each of 734 schools, one from 1997 to 1999 and one 
from 1998 to 2000, and found a correlation of -.03 between them.7 
The authors concluded that “there is a complete lack of stability in 
the two-year change scores. Knowing the magnitude of the gain or 
loss in percent proficient or advanced from 1997 to 1999 tells you 
essentially nothing about the change from 1998 to 2000”.8 
School change scores, then, are flawed indicators of real change in 
school quality. They are influenced not only by measurement error, 
but also by changes in the student population and in the teaching 
staff, making their interpretation as indicators of effective or fail-
ing schools problematic. A third approach to inferring school per-
formance on the basis of student test scores uses the average gain 
in test performance between the end of one grade and the end of 
the next grade. This cohort gain or “value-added” approach, which 
compares the performance of this year’s fourth-grade students with 
their own performance in third grade, requires states to invest in data 
systems that link test scores of individual students across years. This 
approach is used in a handful of states including Arizona, North 
Carolina and Tennessee. Test score changes and gains are generally 
viewed as less biased than level scores as a means of comparing 
schools serving different student populations. They are, however, 
more difficult to measure reliably.9  Moreover, school gain scores have 
been found to be positively correlated with the proportion of white 
and nonpoor students, thus confounding their interpretation as mea-
sures of school effectiveness.10        
Further, the assessment of district quality, also required by NCLB, 
is similarly confounded. Indeed, even assuming away these problems 
in interpreting school change scores, what is to be inferred about the 
performance of a school district in which most but not all schools 
show improvement over a change cycle? The quality of district lead-
ership, policies, communications, and school supports is difficult to 
discern through the use of school change scores. A more valid and 
reliable assessment of school and district effectiveness requires more 
information. Such an assessment is outlined in the next section.  
Assessing School Performance: A Production Function  
Approach
To accurately estimate the “quality” of a school, that is, the school’s 
contribution to student learning, one must account for the relative 
contributions of children’s families, communities, peers, and school 
resource levels to student learning. Put another way, one should 
not confound school quality with other fundamental determinants of 
student performance, particularly when assessments of school quality 
trigger school rewards and sanctions.
One approach to developing school performance measures 
relies upon the concept of production efficiency and techniques for 
measuring such efficiency. This approach utilizes the economist’s no-
tion of a production function.11  Production models have three parts: 
the outcomes sought, the necessary ingredients or inputs, and the 
process that transforms inputs into outcomes. These three parts are 
linked together by a production function. This production function 
reveals the maximum amount of outcome possible for various combi-
nations of inputs. If the supply levels of the various inputs are known 
and the production function is also known, the maximum level of 
outcome (i.e., production) can be determined. Anything short of 
maximum attainable output indicates technical inefficiency.  
A second dimension to production efficiency involves input costs. 
Consider, for example, two alternative educational programs that 
utilize different input combinations to produce the same outcome, 
say, the ability to do mathematics at a specified level. While both 
programs involve teachers’ time, textbooks, worksheets, and the 
like, one may emphasize student-teacher contact while the other 
relies heavily on computer-assisted self-instruction. Assuming that 
each program makes the best possible use of each set of inputs—
that is, each program is technically efficient—the less-costly input 
combination is preferred on allocative efficiency grounds. Put anoth-
er way, production efficiency requires both technical and allocative 
efficiency.
Analysis of educational production is notoriously difficult. First 
of all, education is characterized by multiple outcomes. Schools 
are charged with developing cognitive skills in a number of subject 
areas, as well as affective traits, promoting democratic values and 
furthering other social goals. Some outcomes are jointly produced, 
(e.g., cognitive skills and self-esteem), while others may be mutually 
exclusive (e.g., higher academic standards and higher graduation 
rates). Second, even if it were possible to separate outcomes, there is 
no obvious way to assign a priori weights to reflect the relative value 
of each. Consequently, there is no unambiguous way to sum the 
various production activities into a single outcome measure.
Researchers have responded to the problem of joint production 
of educational outcomes by focusing on one relatively easy to mea-
sure outcome and assuming the other outcomes are produced as by- 
products.  This approach emphasizes student learning and the testing 
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of cognitive skills in key subjects such as reading and mathematics 
and simplifies the analysis of schools’ production efficiency consid-
erably. This approach also enjoys a wide political consensus across 
states and school districts and provides the basis of school account-
ability systems in virtually every state. 
 At the same time, there is growing recognition that any measure 
of school performance (i.e., production efficiency) must account for 
inputs that are beyond the control of those in the school, particularly 
student and community characteristics and school resource levels. 
The production function approach allows us to estimate the mar-
ginal educational contributions of identified educational inputs, both 
“controllable” and “uncontrollable,” and to identify those controlla-
ble inputs with positive marginal products. These estimated products 
can then be compared with corresponding input costs to improve 
allocative efficiency. The production function approach can also be 
used to identify school districts and schools that consistently pro-
duce levels of student achievement that exceed (or fall short of) 
levels predicted by the identified inputs. These consistently higher or 
lower than predicted performance levels can be attributed to practices 
or characteristics of the schools and districts that are not identified 
in the production model. Levin contends that these unmeasured and 
often unobserved practices and characteristics can be very impor-
tant to school performance.12 Levin builds upon Leibenstein’s seminal 
article on x-efficiency in which incentives and other generally unmea-
sured organizational attributes of the firm are viewed as making a 
greater contribution to firm efficiency than the marginal reallocation 
of inputs.13   
 
The Production Function Model
Hanushek proposed a framework for an educational production 
function that distinguishes among family background, peer, and 
school inputs.14  A simplified version of this production function is 
of the following form:
A =ƒ(B, P, S)
where A represents all outcomes, B represents all family background 
inputs, P represents all peer inputs, S represents all school inputs 
and ƒ(.) is the function or production process that transforms the 
inputs into outcomes. Citing the absence of a well-developed theory 
of learning to guide the estimation of this model, Monk observed 
that researchers generally choose input measures on intuitive grounds 
because they are important for policymaking, or because the data are 
readily available.15  All three factors have influenced our selection of 
input variables and outcome measures. Following Hanushek’s frame-
work, we estimated the following model:
A = b
o
 + b1SES + b2RLADMIN + b3RLSUPPORT + b4RLINSTRUCT +
b5RNLINSTRUCT + b6Tch_yrs + b7Tch_sal + b8Tch_age + b9PCT_mas +
b10Tot_adm + b11TotalPP + ∈
where A is measured student achievement in reading and mathematics 
for grades three and five (READ3, READ5, MATH3, and MATH5);16 
SES is an index of family and peer inputs;
RLADMIN is licensed administrators per 1,000 students;
RLSUPPORT is licensed support staff per 1,000 students;
RLINSTRUCT is licensed instructional staff per 1,000 students;
RNLINSTRUCT is non-licensed instructional staff per 1,000 
students;
Tch_yrs is teachers’ average years of teaching experience;
Tch_sal is average teacher salary;
Tch_age is average teacher age;
Pct_mas is percent of teachers with a masters degree;
Tot_adm is total average daily attendance; and
Total PP is total operating expenditures per pupil.
∈ is an error term
A pooled time series of school-level data was obtained from the 
Minnesota Department of Children, Families and Learning for all 
elementary schools in Minnesota for four years, 1998 through 2001. 
All schools reporting data to the state were included in the study. 
Reporting of school-level data was optional in 1998, and 506 schools 
participated that year. Participation rose to 671 schools in 1999, 690 
in 2000, and 694 in 2001, thereby including all elementary schools 
in the state. Data for all variables were reported by participating 
schools, with the exception of teachers’ average years of teaching 
experience for 1998. For that variable, schools’ 1999 data were also 
used in the 1998 data base. Achievement data consisted of building 
average scores on statewide assessments of reading and mathematics 
in grades three and five for each of the four years.17 The SES index is a 
weighted average of five component variables: (1) percent of children 
in the school who are eligible for free or reduced price lunch; (2) 
percent of children who are minority; (3) percent of children who are 
in special education; (4) reported disciplinary incidents as a percent 
of building enrollment; and (5) intra-district mobility rate.18   
Results
Our model was estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), with 
each observation (school) weighted by the square root of the school’s 
average daily membership.19 Separate stepwise regressions were run 
for each of the outcome measures (READ3, READ5, MATH3, and 
MATH5) for each of the four years. Descriptive statistics are present-
ed in Table 1, and regression results are given in Table 2. The F-value 
tolerances for entry and removal of independent variables in the 
stepwise regression routine were set at .20 and .25, respectively.20  
The cross-section regressions reveal the importance of the SES in-
dex in explaining variation in student test scores. SES was statistically 
significant at the .01 level in each equation, with an R2 ranging from 
.487 to .740. Thus, the index explained anywhere from about half to 
three-quarters of the variation in test scores. The SES effect was more 
pronounced in reading, but was also substantially greater with grade 
5 math results than with grade 3 math. Clearly, such powerful SES 
effects would render school level scores meaningless as indicators of 
school quality.
The most influential school variables were teacher characteristics. 
Teacher salary was statistically significant at the .01 level in five 
equations and at the .05 level in two others. All coefficients were 
positive. The effect was greatest for grade 5 math performance, with 
significance in every year. Coefficients on teacher age were positive 
and statistically significant in four equations, all for reading (third 
and fifth grades for both 2000 and 2001). Finally, and somewhat 
surprisingly, the teacher experience coefficient was negative and 
statistically significant in four equations – 1998 READ5, 1999 MATH5, 
2000 MATH3, and 2000 MATH5. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that higher salary schedules have succeeded in recruiting 
and retaining more skilled teachers, all else equal. Beyond that, the 
inconsistent findings regarding teacher age and experience are open 
to varying interpretations and remain ambiguous.
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
READ3 1401.34 74.64 1419.19 79.23 1451.76 83.78 1479.28 79.50
READ5 1407.73 84.51 1442.69 85.79 1483.16 93.76 1536.52 93.97
MATH3 1389.79 93.16 1451.66 97.09 1470.15 95.39 1489.12 91.80
MATH5 1384.64 84.67 1409.77 86.30 1461.05 91.08 1484.99 87.85
SES 365.05 258.43 367.60 270.79 346.6 231.14 344.42 232.39
RLADMIN 2.65 1.78 2.78 1.97 2.81 1.75 2.58 1.78
RLSUPPORT 3.47 2.38 3.35 2.43 3.73 2.13 3.24 2.33
RLINSTRUCT 63.49 13.36 65.26 13.73 67.43 14.62 68.05 13.46
RNLINSTRUCT 18.46 11.14 19.63 11.52 21.07 12.24 21.95 20.60
Tch_yrs 14.91 3.53 14.91 3.53 15.00 3.49 14.35 3.39
Tch_sal 41374.07 5223.84 40569.14 5326.03 40413.01 5322.70 42876.11 5430.58
Tch_age 42.29 3.45 42.22 3.55 41.74 3.30 41.77 3.38
PCT_mas 40.29 20.05 37.35 20.63 37.60 19.98 37.74 20.63
Tot_adm 493 210.86 461.97 213.64 458.66 211.42 452.84 212.40
Total PP 4859.78 3922.34 4818.02 3812.75 5188.81 2522.82 5213.26 2527.40
N 506 671 690 694
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Licensed instructional staff per 1,000 students was also found 
to positively influence student performance. The coefficient on 
RLINSTRUCT was positive and statistically significant in six equa-
tions. Interestingly, five of the six involved math achievement. No 
other resource measures were found to be statistically significant in 
more than two of the sixteen equations. In summary, teaching staff 
seemed important to student achievement, with investment in well-
paid teachers and higher teacher-pupil ratios yielding a positive mar-
ginal product.   
These regression models, as one might expect, are subject to con-
siderable collinearity among the independent variables. This multicol-
linearity increases the variance of our coefficient estimates (while our 
large sample sizes decrease this variance), and the stepwise regres-
sion procedure may overestimate the influence of SES on student 
achievement; that is, the estimated marginal effect of an independent 
variable on student achievement will depend, in part, on the order 
in which it is entered into the estimated model. Consequently, the 
models were re-estimated with the order of entry of the independent 
variables controlled by the researchers.21  
Specifically, in view of the substantial evidence confirming the 
importance of family and peer effects on student achievement and 
the mixed findings regarding school effects, each outcome variable 
was regressed against the SES index only and then regressed over 
the measures of school resources. Finally, each outcome variable was 
regressed over both the SES and school resource variables. The dif-
ferences in the coefficient of determination, or R2, were interpreted 
as upper and lower bounds for the estimated influence of each set 
of independent variables on student achievement given the multicol-
linearity among the variables. These changes in the coefficients of 
determination  are presented in Table 3.
The R2 change associated with the SES index was subtracted from 
the model’s total R2 to derive a lower bound for the effect of the 
school resource measures on student achievement. The SES index 
was found to explain between 45 and 71 percent of the variance in 
student achievement. When the SES index entered the regression first 
and the school resource measures second (collectively designated 
SCHOOL 2 in the table), the SES index is attributed with virtually 
all the power to explain variance in student achievement and negli-
gible influence is attributed to school resources. In contrast, when 
the school resource measures are entered first (SCHOOL 1), their 
assigned explanatory power is about one half the explanatory power 
of SES, indicating considerable collinearity among the SES and school 
resource measures. This collinearity makes it difficult to disentan-
gle and estimate their separate influences on student achievement. 
Moreover, any unobserved school and district effects, as opposed to 
the observed effects of the school resource variables, are concealed in 
the error terms of the regressions.  The magnitude of the unexplained 
variance is (1-TOTAL), labeled E/U for “error/unexplained” variance.
Analysis and Discussion of Residuals
The residuals in these regressions consist of school and district 
fixed effects, both unobserved, along with random error. In order 
to estimate the magnitude of these unobserved but nonrandom 
effects, the residuals were examined for each observation (school) to 
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1998 Dep = MATH5
Step Predictor Entered Beta R-sq Change Cumulative R-sq Adj. R-sq SEE
1 SES -0.845** 0.621 0.621 0.621 257.4244
2 TCH_SAL 0.089** 0.004 0.625 0.624 256.3583
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.108** 0.005 0.63 0.629 254.7226
4 RLADMIN -0.037 0.001 0.631 0.629 254.585
Dep = MATH3
1 SES -0.737** 0.516 0.516 0.515 300.831
2 RNLINST 0.083* 0.002 0.518 0.516 300.361
3 TCH_SAL 0.093 0.004 0.521 0.519 299.482
4 RLADMIN -0.049 0.002 0.523 0.52 299.203
5 PCT_MAS -0.053 0.002 0.524 0.521 298.908
Dep = READ5
1 SES -0.88** 0.715 0.715 0.714 212.774
2 TCH_SAL 0.123* 0.009 0.724 0.723 209.555
3 TCH_YRS -0.086* 0.004 0.728 0.726 208.293
4 TOT_ADM -0.055* 0.002 0.73 0.728 207.788
5 TOTAL PP -0.043 0.002 0.732 0.729 207.252
6 PCT_MAS 0.041 0.001 0.733 0.73 207.06
7 RNLINST 0.033 0.001 0.734 0.73 206.925
Dep = READ3
1 SES -0.909** 0.74 0.74 0.739 179.518
2 TCH_SAL 0.103** 0.002 0.742 0.741 178.865
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.06 0.003 0.745 0.743 178.143
4 TOTAL PP -0.042* 0.001 0.746 0.744 177.877
5 TCH_YRS -0.052 0.001 0.747 0.745 177.66
6 TOT_ADM -0.04 0.001 0.748 0.745 177.387
1999 Dep = MATH5
1 SES -0.812** 0.626 0.626 0.626 424.792
2 TCH_SAL 0.126** 0.008 0.634 0.633 240.519
3 TCH_YRS -0.081* 0.004 0.638 0.636 239.428
4 RLSUPPORT -0.042 0.001 0.639 0.637 239.172
Dep = MATH3
1 SES -0.779** 0.537 0.537 0.536 299.629
2 TCH_SAL 0.077 0.002 0.54 0.538 299.064
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.072* 0.003 0.543 0.541 298.269
Table 2
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Regression Results, 1998-2001
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1999 Dep = READ5
Step Predictor Entered Beta R-sq Change Cumulative R-sq Adj. R-sq SEE
1 SES -0.788** 0.687 0.687 0.687 221.732
2 PCT_MAS 0.068** 0.006 0.693 0.692 219.848
3 TOTAL PP -0.057 0.003 0.695 0.694 219.102
4 RNLINST -0.039 0.001 0.697 0.695 218.779
Dep = READ3
1 SES -0.835** 0.623 0.623 0.623 222.226
2 TCH_SAL 0.135** 0.006 0.629 0.628 220.559
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.057 0.002 0.632 0.63 220.069
4 TOTAL PP -0.048 0.002 0.633 0.631 219.742
5 TOTAL ADM -0.046 0.001 0.634 0.631 219.633
6 TCH YRS -0.044 0.001 0.636 0.632 219.376
2000 Dep = MATH5
1 SES -0.903** 0.703 0.703 0.702 217.937
2 PCT_MAS 0.089 0.008 0.711 0.709 215.316
3 TCH_YRS -0.11** 0.003 0.713 0.711 214.554
4 TCH_SAL 0.143** 0.005 0.718 0.716 212.831
5 (PCT_MAS deleted) --- -0.001 0.718 0.716 212.841
6 RNLINST 0.057* 0.003 0.72 0.718 212.054
Dep = MATH3
1 SES -0.854** 0.641 0.641 0.641 262.585
2 TCH_YRS -0.073* 0.002 0.643 0.642 262.172
3 TCH_SAL 0.097 0.004 0.647 0.645 261.017
4 RLIINSTRUCT 0.082* 0.003 0.65 0.647 260.087
5 TOTAL PP -0.06 0.003 0.653 0.65 259.212
Dep = READ5
1 SES -.829** 0.668 0.668 0.667 248.37
2 TCH_AGE 0.053* 0.003 0.67 0.669 247.57
3 RLSUPPORT 0.033 0.001 0.671 0.67 247.418
Dep = READ3
1 SES -0.858** 0.677 0.677 0.677 218.507
2 TCH_AGE 0.102* 0.005 0.682 0.681 217.126
3 TCH_YRS -0.079 0.002 0.684 0.683 216.556
4 TCH_SAL 0.069 0.001 0.685 0.683 216.37
5 PCT_MAS -0.045 0.001 0.686 0.684 216.165
Table 2 Continued
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Regression Results, 1998-2001
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2001 Dep = MATH5
Step Predictor Entered Beta R-sq Change Cumulative R-sq Adj. R-sq SEE
1 SES -0.847** 0.604 0.604 0.603 254.654
2 TCH_SAL 0.123* 0.004 0.608 0.607 253.507
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.119** 0.004 0.612 0.61 252.272
4 RLSUPPORT -0.063* 0.002 0.614 0.611 251.926
5 TCH_YRS -0.054 0.002 0.615 0.613 251.562
6 TOT_ADM -0.041 0.001 0.616 0.613 251.381
7 RNLINST -0.035 0.001 0.617 0.614 251.236
Dep = MATH3
1 SES -0.722** 0.487 0.487 0.486 296.404
2 TCH_YRS 0.049 0.005 0.492 0.491 295.053
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.105* 0.003 0.495 0.493 294.452
4 RLSUPPORT -0.079* 0.003 0.498 0.495 293.703
5 TCH_SAL 0.048 0.002 0.5 0.496 293.428
Dep = READ5
1 SES -0.883** 0.681 0.681 0.68 244.95
2 TCH_AGE 0.137** 0.007 0.688 0.687 242.34
3 RLINSTRUCT 0.068* 0.003 0.691 0.689 241.47
4 TCH_YRS -0.074 0.001 0.692 0.69 241.07
5 TOT ADM -0.041 0.001 0.693 0.691 240.8
6 RNLINST -0.034 0.001 0.694 0.692 240.58
Dep = READ3
1 SES -0.791** 0.616 0.616 0.615 225.163
2 TCH_AGE 0.098** 0.011 0.627 0.625 222.107
3 TOT_ADM -0.038 0.001 0.628 0.626 221.874
Table 2 Continued
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Regression Results, 1998-2001
** denotes p < .01
* denotes .01 < p < .05
identify schools and districts that consistently over- or under- 
performed as compared with outcome levels predicted by the SES 
and school resource measures. For example, a school that consis-
tently exceeded its test performance as predicted by its students’ 
characteristics (SES) and resource levels is assumed to benefit from 
positive but unobserved school and district attributes, attributes 
sometimes referred to as X-efficiency. For each outcome (i.e., grade 
level and subject), the residual was averaged by school building over 
the four years. Data for all four years were available for 476 schools. 
If the residuals were random, they would necessarily have a mean 
of zero.22 They are not random, however, if they include the effects 
of unobserved variables that influence student achievement. Spe-
cifically, the average building residual reflected the joint effect on 
achievement made by the school and district. To decompose this 
effect into school and district effects, the residuals were averaged by 
school district, and the district average was subtracted from the total 
residual. The district average was interpreted as the upper bound 
for the district effect, and the difference between the total building 
residual and the district average was interpreted as the upper bound 
for the school effect.
To estimate the magnitude of these unobserved building and 
district effects on student achievement, the achievement measures 
were then regressed over these average residuals and the SES and 
school resource measures. The R2 changes resulting from these step-
wise regressions are presented in Table 4. As the results reported 
in Table 4 indicate, the district accounted for between 6 and 12 
percent of the variance in measured achievement across all esti-
mated models, averaging about 11 percent for mathematics and 8 
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98 99 00 01 Avg.
SES 0.6122 0.5034 0.4830 0.4492 0.5120
SCHOOL 1 0.3120 0.2226 0.2517 0.2545 0.2602
SCHOOL 2 0.0129 0.0081 0.0107 0.0200 0.0129
SES+SCH2 0.6251 0.5115 0.4937 0.4692 0.5249
E/U 0.3749 0.4885 0.5063 0.5308 0.4751
N 506 671 691 695
Table 3
Upper and Lower Bounds for Estimates of R2 Changes
Summary for MATH5
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
SES 0.6867 0.6033 0.5863 0.5704 0.6117
SCHOOL 1 0.3605 0.2905 0.3007 0.2656 0.3043
SCHOOL 2 0.0202 0.0107 0.0107 0.0074 0.0123
SES+SCH2 0.7069 0.6140 0.5970 0.5778 0.6239
E/U 0.2931 0.3860 0.4030 0.4222 0.3761
N 506 671 691 695
Summary for READING3
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
SES 0.7105 0.5849 0.6460 0.5753 0.6292
SCHOOL 1 0.3543 0.2642 0.3528 0.3257 0.3243
SCHOOL 2 0.0074 0.0141 0.0129 0.0195 0.0135
SES+SCH2 0.7179 0.5990 0.6589 0.5948 0.6427
E/U 0.2821 0.4010 0.3411 0.4052 0.3574
N 506 671 691 695
Summary for READING5
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
SES 0.7002 0.6655 0.6396 0.6483 0.6634
SCHOOL 1 0.3711 0.3535 0.3543 0.3308 0.3524
SCHOOL 2 0.0180 0.0120 0.0088 0.0129 0.0129
SES+SCH2 0.7182 0.6775 0.6484 0.6612 0.6763
E/U 0.2818 0.3225 0.3516 0.3388 0.3237
N 506 671 691 695
percent for reading. The building accounted for between 11 and 18 
percent of the variance in measured achievement, averaging about 
16 percent for mathematics and 14 percent for reading. When the 
district is omitted from the regression, and the entire effect is at-
tributed to the building, the building effect rises to an average of 
22 percent for reading and 27 percent for mathematics. These ef-
fects, which reflect unobserved qualities of school administrators, 
faculty, support staff, and the climate they create, along with other 
unobserved variables, are substantial. The R2 changes associated 
with building and district effects were then added to the R2 changes 
associated with SES and school resource effects to obtain an estimate 
of the total explained variance in student achievement (R2total). The 
unexplained variance is estimated as (1-R2total) and is attributable to 
random error.
 One may expect that these unobserved school and district ef-
fects would be roughly consistent across grades and subjects; that 
is, a good elementary school is good in all grades and subjects. To 
further examine the consistency of these effects across subjects and 
grades, the simple correlations across subjects and grades were ex-
amined.  These correlation coefficients are presented in Table 5. The 
correlations are relatively high, confirming that the fixed effects or 
levels of x-efficiency taking place within a school building and school 
district tended to be consistent across subjects and grades over the 
four-year period examined. This conforms to intuition. The effects of 
such unobserved school and district variables as climate, communi-
cations, shared vision and goals, leadership, and incentives should be 
reflected throughout the school and not restricted to particular grades 
and subjects.   
More generally, this consistent pattern of fixed effects or x-effi-
ciency among the district and building residuals provides a measure 
of school and district influence on the quality of teaching and learn-
ing in the classroom. Not surprisingly, effective schools are found in 
effective districts. This finding was consistent across subjects and 
grade levels. Such a pattern of residuals reflects the effects of activi-
ties, climate, policies, incentives, instructional practices, and other 
inputs that are consistently present in the schools and districts but 
are not captured by the SES or school resource variables.23 
Summary and Policy Conclusions
In keeping with a vast research literature on educational productiv-
ity, this analysis revealed that the socioeconomic characteristics of 
students remain the most influential factor in predicting achievement 
outcomes. A high SES school building (three standard deviations 
above the mean) can be expected to add about 30 percentile points 
to the average achievement level, raising a student from the 50th 
percentile to about the 80th, while a correspondingly low SES build-
ing would fall 30 percentile points below the mean. This relationship 
is depicted in standardized units in Figure 1. 
SES exerted a much larger influence on academic achievement than 
did the various measures of school resources. Further, our estimates of 
school district and building fixed effects were considerably larger than 
the estimated effects of the school resource variables. This finding is 
consistent with Leibenstein, who observed in his seminal article on 
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Table 4
Analysis of Residuals: Building and District Fixed Effects
Summary for MATH3
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
Four Year Avg.   N (E/U for the same N) 476
TOTAL 0.8389 0.8049 0.7922 0.7861 0.8055
BUILDING 0.1431 0.1696 0.1336 0.1978 0.1610
DISTRICT 0.0707 0.1238 0.1649 0.1191 0.1196
B AND D 0.2138 0.2934 0.2985 0.3169 0.2807
SES+SCH2 0.6251 0.5115 0.4937 0.4692 0.5249
ERROR 0.1611 0.1951 0.2078 0.2139 0.1945
Summary for MATH5
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
Four Year Avg.   N (E/U for the same N) 476
TOTAL .09353 0.8830 0.8955 0.8584 0.8931
BUILDING 0.1281 0.1544 0.1805 0.1704 0.1584
DISTRICT 0.1003 0.1146 0.1180 0.1102 0.1108
B AND D 0.2284 0.2690 0.2985 0.2806 0.2691
SES+SCH2 0.7069 0.6140 0.5970 0.5778 0.6239
ERROR 0.0647 0.1170 0.1045 0.1416 0.1070
Summary for READING3
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
Four Year Avg.   N (E/U for the same N) 476
TOTAL 0.9503 0.8212 0.9152 0.8163 0.8758
BUILDING 0.1111 0.1474 0.1274 0.1632 0.1373
DISTRICT 0.0640 0.0850 0.0948 0.0931 0.0842
B AND D 0.1751 0.2324 0.2222 0.2563 0.2215
SES+SCH2 0.7179 0.5990 0.6589 0.5948 0.6427
ERROR 0.0497 0.1788 0.0848 0.1837 0.1243
Summary for READING5
Year
98 99 00 01 Avg.
Four Year Avg.   N (E/U for the same N) 476
TOTAL 0.9383 0.9100 0.8723 0.8832 0.9009
BUILDING 0.1253 0.1338 0.1503 0.1487 0.1395
DISTRICT 0.0860 0.0863 0.0822 0.0752 0.0824
B AND D 0.2113 0.2201 0.2325 0.2239 0.2220
SES+SCH2 0.7182 0.6775 0.6484 0.6612 0.6763
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X-efficiency in organizations that incentives, motivation, culture, and 
other organizational characteristics have far greater implications for 
efficiency than the allocation of inputs at the margins. 
By our estimates, unobserved district characteristics exerted an 
influence on achievement outcomes, adding about five points at the 
high end (i.e., three standard deviations above the mean) and sub-
tracting about five points at the low (i.e., three standard deviations 
below the mean). These effects are depicted in standardized units in 
Figure 2.
Unobserved building characteristics also exerted an influence on 
achievement outcomes, adding about seven points at the high end 
and subtracting about seven points at the low. These estimated 
effects are depicted in standardized units in Figure 3.
These findings hold several important implications for school 
accountability policies. First, holding schools accountable for average 
levels of measured achievement outcomes is tantamount to holding 
them accountable for the SES of the community. Level scores of 
Table 5
Consistency of Building and District Effects:
Correlations Among Estimates Across Grades and Subjects
Correlations
MATH 5 READ 5




READ 5 READ 5






















student achievement say little about school quality. To ascribe high 
quality to schools in which children attain high scores on achieve-
ment tests is to confuse school quality with student attributes. 
Second, when SES and school resource variables are taken into con-
sideration, high-performing and low-performing schools are found 
in all SES strata. Holding schools accountable for achievement out-
comes when SES and school resources are taken into consideration 
may be appropriate. This could be accomplished by means of “value-
added” analysis of the results of annual testing of every student in 
a school.  
Further, a production function model of student achievement could 
be used to identify school districts and buildings that consistently 
exceed predicted performance levels. These school and districts 
should be the subject of case studies to identify the sources of their 
x-efficiency. Insights gained into school and, particularly, district 
climate, policies, operations, and incentives could be invaluable as 
states look for ways to improve teaching and learning in their public 
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schools in an economic environment that promises little in the way 
of increased resources in the near future. Case studies of this sort are 
not unusual in education research but are generally not conducted as 
part of an ongoing and systematic state-level effort to improve teach-
ing and learning in our public schools. Currently, state departments 
of education and regional educational service agencies generally do 
not gather information regarding the behavior, activities, policies, or 
leadership at the school district or building levels that could explain 
differences in achievement outcomes across schools. Such qualitative 
data could be of enormous value to the schools. As the saying goes, 
“Not everything that counts can be counted,” but leadership and 
sound practice can be observed and replicated.  
Figure 3
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